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An attorney owes a professional duty to his or her client to
protect the client's confidences and, as a corollary, to invoke
the attorney-client privilege on the client's behalf, where an-
other party uses compulsory legal process to attempt to force
the attorney (or client) to disclose such confidences.1 How does
this duty play out where the attorney's client is the federal
government? Who controls the decision to assert or waive the
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Kathleen Clark, and David McGowan for their com-
ments on earlier drafts and to Jill Radloff, Meg Garvin, and Ken Prine for in-
valuable research assistance. The views expressed are my own.
The reader should be informed that, in April 1998, before the case of In re
Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316), was briefed and argued to the D.C. Cir-
cuit, I sent an earlier draft of this article to Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr. (The Independent Counsel's Office had been very helpful in providing
my research assistant with copies of the public versions of the briefs and other
materials involved in the case In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997), and I had known
Judge Starr during the time when we both worked in the Department of Jus-
tice in the administration of President George Bush, from 1989-1991).
The Independent Counsel's office subsequently advanced the Garner cor-
porate-privilege analogy (a major thesis of this article) in its arguments to the
D.C. Circuit, though not in the form presented in the April 1998 draft version
of this article, and the D.C. Circuit made use of that analogy, see infra Part
V. (The Independent Counsers office had not made the Garner argument in
the Eighth Circuit.) I have not, however, served as counsel or consultant in
this matter for any party or amicus. This article does not reflect the position
of the Independent Counsel, nor do the views of the Independent Counsel cor-
respond with the position I have taken here.
1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 (1995)
[hereinafter MODEL RULES]. For purposes of this article, I will treat the
Model Rules as the most important "guidepost" of the government lawyer's
professional obligations, but with several important caveats, noted at length
below. See infra note 44.
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attorney-client privilege that the United States government, as
a distinct legal entity, may have as against other entities or in-
dividuals who seek to compel production of material or infor-
mation that otherwise falls within the bounds of the traditional
attorney-client privilege?
My thesis in this article is that the United States govern-
ment possesses, as a matter of common law, the same attorney-
client privilege that exists for a corporation or other organiza-
tional entity. That privilege extends to communications made
by subordinate officers or employees of the government to the
government attorney, for purposes of enabling the attorney to
give legal advice to the government, as an organization. 2 It is,
however, the entity-the United States government-and not
the individual making the communication, that is the client.
Joint representation of the government as an organization and
the individual government officer is, and should be, strongly
disfavored on conflict-of-interest grounds.3 Typically, in the
corporate context, present management controls the decision
whether to invoke or waive the privilege, and the same should
hold true with respect to the government's (that is, the execu-
2. The seminal case delineating the scope of the corporate attorney-
client privilege (and, by implication, the scope of the privilege for any type of
organizational or "entity" client) is Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981).
3. See MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.7(a) (prohibiting representa-
tion of directly conflicting interests unless both clients consent and the lawyer
reasonably believes that joint representation will not affect the relationship
with either client); id. Rule 1.7(b) (prohibiting representation of party where
representation may be materially limited by duty to another client, or to third
person, unless affected client consents and the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be affected). But cf id. Rule 1.13(e) (noting the poten-
tial for joint representation of both the entity and one or more of its constitu-
ents, to the extent consistent with Rule 1.7).
The United States government has adopted regulations providing for
separate representation of governmental employees who are subpoenaed,
sued, or charged in connection with conduct taken in their capacity as gov-
ernment officers or employees. These regulations recognize that the United
States as an entity has an interest in providing for the representation of (at
least some) individual officers or employees in such situations, but also that
conflicts of interest frequently may arise between the government as an entity
and the interests of the individual officer. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1997); see
also, e.g., 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 54 (1989); 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 749
(1980) (distinguishing between representation of personal interests and gov-
ernmental interests). The reader should be informed that I was involved in
the formulation of the 1989 Office of Legal Counsel opinion and the 1989 ver-




five's) attorney-client privilege.4 Under Article H of the Consti-
tution, the President is the Chief Executive Officer of USA,
Inc., and thus, ordinarily, controls the privilege.
But the issue becomes more problematic in the context of
assertion of the privilege against an Independent Counsel in-
vestigating executive branch officials. We live today in a legal
and political regime under which one or more Independent
Counsel frequently exercise a portion of the control over the
law-execution function of the United States government. Since
Morrison v. Olsons-and, arguably, ever since United States v.
Nixon6 -the executive branch of the United States government
has, from time to time, been subjected to divided executive
management.
My topic concerns one of the many important practical
consequences that flows from this post-Morrison constitutional
order: how control over the government's attorney-client privi-
lege works under a regime of divided executive management of
USA, Inc. The question has spawned contentious disputes in
the various Independent Counsel investigations swirling
around the administration of President Bill Clinton. The
courts' answers to this question to date have had enormous
public consequences, including raising the possibility that
President Clinton may be impeached or forced to resign from
office.
7
In 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit, in the innocuously-titled but hugely important case of
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum 8 (denied review un-
der the more provocative, divided-executive caption of Office of
the President v. Office of Independent Counsel), considered a
claim by the Clinton White House of attorney-client privilege
against a grand jury subpoena issued in connection with the
investigation of Whitewater Independent Counsel Kenneth
Starr. The subpoena and the claim of privilege concerned
notes taken by attorneys in the Office of Counsel to the Presi-
4- See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
358 (1985); Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
7. See David Roger, Lewinsky Documents to Add New Dimension to
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998, at A30 (describing the increasing num-
ber of Americans who favor resignation and the continuing congressional pro-
ceedings toward formal impeachment hearings).
8. 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997).
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dent (popularly known as "White House Counsel") of meetings
with the President's wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, and her
privately-retained personal counsel during breaks at Mrs.
Clinton's grand jury testimony concerning the mysterious dis-
appearance and reappearance of Rose Law Firm billing records
from the White House residence.9 The grand jury subpoena
also sought White House Counsel notes of conversations with
Mrs. Clinton concerning her actions following the suicide of
White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster in 1993. The
White House abandoned an earlier claim of "executive privi-
lege" with respect to the notes.'0 The Eighth Circuit's contro-
versial opinion rejected, by vote of 2-1, the claim of executive
branch attorney-client privilege as against an Independent
Counsel conducting a federal criminal investigation, on the
ground that the privilege simply does not exist in such a con-
text.
In 1998, in a dramatic series of events, the D.C. Circuit
considered essentially the same issue in a slightly different fac-
tual context. In re Lindsey" initially involved claims by Dep-
uty White House Counsel Bruce Lindsey of both executive
privilege and governmental attorney-client privilege as the ba-
sis for refusing to answer grand jury inquiries about his con-
versations with President Bill Clinton and others, concerning
President Clinton's possible unlawful conduct, and the White
House's responses to legal proceedings investigating such con-
duct, on a wide range of matters-most notoriously, the possi-
bility that President Clinton committed peijury and obstruc-
9. These billing records reflected work done by Mrs. Clinton, as an at-
torney with the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock, Arkansas, in connection with
Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan Association, a federally insured savings
and loan in Little Rock, operated by James McDougal and Susan McDougal.
The McDougals and the Clintons jointly owned the Whitewater Development
Company as a real estate venture. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in
Opposition at 1-3, Office of the President v. Office of Independent Counsel,
117 S.Ct. 2482 (1996) (No. 96-1783).
10. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 914. The record of the
case and the briefs of the parties give no indication of why the White House
abandoned this argument, but it is likely that the White House lawyers sim-
ply believed that its prospects of success, under the analysis of United States
v. Nixon, were poor. The documents described in the subpoena do not appear
to concern executive branch deliberations, let alone deliberations involving
the President.
11. 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
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tion of justice in connection with the Paula Jones sexual har-
assment civil litigation, in which Clinton was a defendant.
12
In the litigation leading to the Lindsey opinion, attorneys
for Clinton and the White House initially emphasized a claim
of executive privilege, in part because of evident concerns that
a claim of attorney-client privilege might not prevail in light of
the Eighth Circuit's analysis in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum.13 When both claims were rejected by the district
court,14 President Clinton's lawyers filed a notice of appeal.
15
Independent Counsel Starr, in response, asked the Supreme
Court to take the extraordinary step of granting certiorari be-
fore judgment, thereby leapfrogging the D.C. Circuit.' 6 Clin-
ton's lawyers, in an effort to make the case seem less worthy of
such extraordinary and expedited review, served notice that
Clinton would drop the claim of executive privilege. 17 The ma-
neuver worked-in part. The Supreme Court denied the writ
of certiorari, but noted its expectation that the D.C. Circuit
would proceed expeditiously. 18 The D.C. Circuit thereupon or-
dered expedited briefing and heard and decided the case within
two months of the Supreme Court's order denying certiorari be-
forejudgment.' 9
Like the Eighth Circuit before it, a divided panel of the
D.C. Circuit held that considerations of public policy did not
warrant recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege
as against a federal grand jury's criminal inquiry conducted by
an Independent Counsel. If anything, the D.C. Circuit's opin-
ion was of even greater doctrinal-and especially political-
significance than that of the Eighth Circuit. The D.C. Circuit's
decision in Lindsey, combined with the decision of another
12. See Jerry Seper, Lindsey Provides Long-Awaited Testimony to Grand
Jury; White House Tried to Circumvent It by Citing Attorney-Client Privilege,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1998, at A4.
13. See infra note 60.
14. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp.2d 21 (D.D.C. 1998).
15. See James Bennet, Clinton Dismisses Parallels to Nixon Case, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 1998, at A20.
16. See Stephen Labathon, Starr Asks Supreme Court to Speed Process
For Ruling on President's Privilege Claims, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1998, at Al.
17. See infra note 60.
18. See United States v. Clinton, 118 S.Ct. 2079 (1998).
19. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (issuing
opinion on July 27, 1998 after expedited hearings upon the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari on June 4, 1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Nov.
9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
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panel of the D.C. Circuit just weeks earlier, denying the Clin-
ton administration's claim of a Secret Service "protective func-
tions" testimonial privilege as against a federal criminal inves-
tigation and the refusal of Chief Justice Rehnquist to grant a
stay in either case, was a contributing proximate cause of Clin-
ton's being forced to acknowledge (in part) having publicly lied
for over seven months about the conduct under investigation,
and of having (at least) given deceptive testimony in his depo-
sition in the Jones lawsuit.20 It is no exaggeration to say that
the D.C. Circuit's rejection of a governmental attorney-client
privilege that would permit Lindsey to refuse to answer ques-
tions before a grand jury concerning Lindsey's conversations
with President Clinton, was a significant factor in the series of
events leading to exposure of presidential misconduct in of-
fice-exposure that, as this article goes to press, may to lead to
President Clinton's impeachment or resignation.21
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum and In re Lind-
sey provide useful and important vehicles for considering the
question of who controls-who "owns"--the government's at-
torney-client privilege, both generally and in the special con-
text of an Independent Counsel investigation. The Eighth Cir-
cuit's exposition of the privilege, as applied in the government
context, appears unsound on several points. The D.C. Circuit's
treatment is an improvement, but hits on the crucial point-
the lack of presidential supremacy in asserting the executive
branch's attorney-client privilege against an Independent
Counsel representing the United States government-only
glancingly. The D.C. Circuit's judgment, like the Eighth Cir-
cuit's, ultimately rests on the debatable policy judgment that
the government's attorney-client privilege ought not to apply
intra-government, against federal criminal grand jury pro-
ceedings, and that the chilling effect of its absence in that con-
text would not have serious detrimental effects on legitimate
governmental deliberations involving the need for legal counsel
20. See Susan Schmidt and Ruth Marcus, The Legal Gamble: To Say Just
Enough; Clinton Relies on a Narrow Definition, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1998, at
Al (noting that Clinton admitted his testimony in the Jones trial was mis-
leading but claimed that it was still "legally accurate"); Office of the President
v. Office of the Independent Counsel, App. No. A-108, 1998 WL 438524, at *1
(U.S. Aug. 4, 1998) (denying stay); In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (denying en banc rehearing).
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
478 [Vol. 83:473
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
(or, at least, would have no more serious detrimental effects
than does the absence of executive privilege, under Nixon.)
Despite weaknesses in analysis, both courts' conclusions
are nonetheless correct, not for mere "policy" reasons, but be-
cause of the unique situation of federal Independent Counsel
investigations in a post-Morrison constitutional world. Control
of the attorney-client privilege of USA, Inc. is greatly affected
by the "corporate" governance structure of USA, Inc., which in
turn is a function of the constitutional law of Article II. In a
post-Morrison world, the issue presented by assertions of
"executive attorney-client privilege" as against an Independent
Counsel acting within the sphere of his assigned jurisdiction, is
analogous to the privilege issue presented when management
of a corporation has passed into the hands of a trustee or suc-
cessor, or when a shareholders' derivative suit makes a thresh-
old showing of "good cause" to believe that management has
violated a duty to the corporation.22 In the former case, control
of the corporation-and thus control of the privilege-has
passed into the hands of new management, and former man-
agement's claims of privilege on behalf of the corporation are
without effect.23 In the latter case, a corporate constituent or
beneficiary that has made a sufficient showing of a likely viola-
tion by present management of a fiduciary obligation to the
corporation, is provided with access to information that would
otherwise fall within the corporation's attorney-client privilege,
for the limited purposes of the litigation challenging present
management's conduct.24 Application of these doctrines, well-
accepted in the corporate context, to the analogous situation of
an Independent 'Counsel investigation of possible federal
criminal wrongdoing involving executive branch officials,
friends, and intimate associates, yields the conclusion that, in
the context of such an investigation, the Independent Counsel,
not the President of the United States, controls the decision to
invoke or waive the United States government's attorney-client
privilege. 25
22. See Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1112 (per curiam); infra Part IV.
23. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348-49 (1985).
24. See Garner v. Wolfmbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). I discuss
the Garner doctrine at length below. See discussion infra Part V.
25. Cf Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1112 (denying the President the right to in-
voke the attorney-client privilege). For further discussion, see infra Part V.
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In what follows, I set forth in greater detail the doctrinal
basis for this conclusion, which differs significantly from the
analysis of the Eighth Circuit and, in crucial respects, from
that of the D.C. Circuit as well. In Part H, I examine the con-
stitutional law that has restructured executive branch govern-
ance in the past twenty-five years, and its implications for gov-
ernment lawyering and attorney-client privilege within the
executive branch. In Part III, I argue that the Eighth Circuit
wrongly analogized governmental attorney-client privilege to
executive privilege under United States v. Nixon,26 and wrongly
rejected the analogy to the corporate attorney-client privilege
recognized by the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United
States.27 For purposes of applying an attorney's duty of confi-
dentiality and the law of attorney-client privilege, the United
States of America should be treated as a "corporate" entity
(albeit one of a special sort and with a distinctive governance
structure). The attorney-client privilege of USA, Inc. should be
governed by principles analogous to those applied in any other
corporate context.
In Part IV, I examine the variations on this theme devel-
oped in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in In re Lindsey. While that
opinion picks up on the corporate privilege analogy,28 it does so
only in the limited context of discussing how the "chilling ef-
fect" of denying the privilege is not materially different in the
governmental than in the corporate context, and is thus
"similarly acceptable"29-a debatable proposition as a policy
matter. I argue that the correct analysis of the issue focuses
not (as the Lindsey majority thought) on whether the policy
underlying the government's attorney-client privilege applies
in the context of a grand jury proceeding, but on the more fun-
damental question of who has power to make or waive such a
claim of privilege.
In Part V, I address how the corporate analogy answers
the question of who controls the United States Government's
decision to assert or waive its attorney-client privilege. As to
most matters-and as against all parties outside the executive
branch of government-the Article II principles of a unitary
executive and of presidential supremacy within the executive
26. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
27. 449 U.S. 383 (1980).




branch dictate the conclusion that the President of the United
States controls the attorney-client privilege of the United
States, for as long as the President holds office. But in the con-
text of an Independent Counsel investigation, the President
may not assert the privilege against a duly-appointed Inde-
pendent Counsel representing the United States government
in the matter and acting within the sphere of her assigned ju-
risdiction. The Independent Counsel, not the President,
"owns" the executive's attorney-client privilege in such a situa-
tion.
H. NIXON AND MORRISON
Once upon a time, "divided government" meant that Con-
gress and the presidency were controlled by different political
parties. It still means that, of course, but now it often means
something more: divided management of the executive power of
the United States government. The constitutional principles of
a unitary executive and of presidential executive supremacy
are set forth clearly-one would think unmistakably-in the
text of Article II of the Constitution. Article II of the Constitu-
tion vests the executive power, in its entirety, in "a President of
the United States."30 As others have argued, both the text and
historical evidence of its original meaning and purpose estab-
lish that the President must have control over the execution of
the laws of the United States, including the power to counter-
mand or displace the decisions of all subordinate executive offi-
cers.31 The framers consciously rejected proposals for a plural
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
31. For a comprehensive treatment of the unitary executive issue, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (responding in part to the contrary
arguments made in Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994)); see also Steven G. Calabresi
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the
Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority
Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62 (1990); Gary Lawson,
The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994);
Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalist Perspective on Why the
Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Henry P. Monaghan, The
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1993); Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and
the President's Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991 (1993).
I have bemoaned the death of the unitary executive elsewhere. See Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous
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executive, and their decision to vest the executive governance
of the United States of America in a single official is about as
unequivocally set forth in the final text of Article II as it is pos-
sible for such things to be. Unfortunately, the principle of
presidential executive supremacy within a unitary executive
branch was badly wounded in United States v. Nixon,32 was
mugged and left for dead in Morrison v. Olson,33 and, as a con-
sequence, probably will not rise again.
In Nixon, the Supreme Court implicitly but necessarily
rejected the argument that the President speaks finally for the
interest of the executive branch with respect to whether execu-
tive privilege should limit the information available to an in-
dependent special federal prosecutor in a federal criminal pro-
ceeding.34 The Court held, unanimously, under the somewhat
misleading rubric of "justiciability," that the President does not
speak finally for the executive interest in such a situation, at
least not where an unrescinded regulation has delegated ex-
ecutive jurisdiction over the matter to the special prosecutor.35
Rather, a presidential decision as to the executive interest in
the matter may be disputed by the special prosecutor, with the
dispute resolved by the courts.36 That, far more than the spe-
cific ruling as to the scope and applicability of President
Nixon's executive privilege claim in that case, is the more sig-
nificant holding of the Nixon Tapes case.37 The President re-
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81, 85 n.8 (1993); Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Theme of
Robert M. Cover's JUSTICE ACCUSED, 7 J. LAW & RELIGION 33, 85 n.138
(1989). Nonetheless, as noted below, I acknowledge that death for purposes of
this article, and pursue its implications for the doctrine of executive attorney-
client privilege. See infra note 43.
32. 418 U.S. at 694-95 (recognizing that a special prosecutor may contest
the President's invocation of executive privilege).
33. 487 U.S. 654 (1987) (vesting any control which the President may
have over an independent counsel with the Attorney General).
34. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 692-97.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See William Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of
United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 116, 130-40 (1974). Professor Van
Alstyne's article is prophetic in its identification of the greatest significance of
Nixon being its potential to "particle-ize" the executive power. Id. at 136. In
a forthcoming article in the Minnesota Law Review, I argue that the most sig-
nificant holding of Nixon is the Court's assertion of (and Nixon's acquiescence
to) absolute judicial supremacy over the executive on questions of the respec-
tive constitutional powers of the two branches. See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-five Years, 83 MiNN.
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tained the last-ditch power to prevail over the special prosecu-
tor by rescinding the regulation granting prosecutorial power
to the prosecutor; but the political reality was that such rescis-
sion probably was impossible for President Nixon by the time
the case was decided. The Court's holding, combined with the
political precedent it created, effectively established the im-
plicit rule that the President may not countermand the actions
of a (nominally) subordinate executive officer except through
the blunt and awkward tool of removing him from office.
In Morrison, the question of presidential executive su-
premacy over the independent prosecutor was not even on the
table, for the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act had essentially institutionalized the insula-
tion of Independent Counsel from presidential direction and
control.38 Moreover, the Act explicitly authorized an Independ-
ent Counsel to contest claims of privilege by executive branch
officials.39 The only remaining question was whether the acute
limitations placed on the President's ability to remove an Inde-
pendent Counsel violated Article II. It was the constitutional-
ity of precisely such insulation from presidential appointment,
direction, and removal that was the issue in Morrison. The
Court, by vote of 7-1 (Justice Scalia being the lone dissenter),
upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel ar-
rangement in its entirety.
Taken together, Nixon and Morrison stand for the proposi-
tion that the President of the United States is not constitution-
ally entitled to the final word as to the interest of the executive
branch concerning issues arising in a federal criminal prosecu-
tion within the jurisdiction of an independent counsel; and that
such a limitation on presidential executive supremacy does not
violate Article II of the Constitution, as construed by the Su-
preme Court. The President of the United States no longer
speaks definitively and exclusively for the interests of the
United States in certain matters of federal criminal law en-
forcement. Rather, in the context of an Independent Counsel
investigation, the Article II "executive power"-the manage-
ment of the United States Government-is divided, uneasily
and awkwardly from a constitutional standpoint, between the
elected Chief Executive of the United States (CEO) and an in-
L. REV. (forthcoming May 1999) (symposium on United States v. Nixon).
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(5) (1994).
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dependent ombudsman/trustee/investigator who possesses her
own jurisdiction and who is not accountable to the CEO for her
exercise of the executive power within that jurisdiction (except
under the narrowest of circumstances). 40 She is subject to the
supervision only of the panel of "outside directors" (the special
three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit) who appointed her (once
the President, through the Attorney General, acquiesces in the
need for an appointment to be made).
4 1
This arrangement doubtless constitutes a significant de-
parture from what Justice Scalia, dissenting in Morrison,
wryly called "our former constitutional system."42 But for bet-
ter or worse, that issue is, in all probability, now behind us.
While Nixon and Morrison, taken together, constitute signifi-
cant departures from the original Article II plan of presidential
executive supremacy, that departure must (at least for now) be
taken as a given.
43
40. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 663-64 (1988) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)-(a)(3) (restrictions on power to remove an Independent
Counsel)).
41. See id. at 664 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2)).
42. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. The constitutional view of Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison is un-
likely to be returned to our constitutional order except through the unilateral
decision of the executive branch to refuse to acquiesce to an arrangement it
considers unconstitutional (for example, by declining to appoint Independent
Counsel pursuant to the statute) or implicitly through major revision or aban-
donment of the Independent Counsel statute by Congress. I have argued
elsewhere that the President is not bound, within the sphere of his executive
power, by Supreme Court decisions that he is persuaded are wrong as a mat-
ter of faithful interpretation of the Constitution. See Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83
GEO. L.J. 217 (1994). A President who believes that Morrison departs from
the true interpretation of Article II of the Constitution should-and arguably
must, as a matter of constitutional duty-decline to seek the appointment of
an Independent Counsel under the provisions of the statute.
The political pressures that invariably exist when appointment of an in-
dependent counsel is sought may make that context an especially difficult one
in which to press a President's independent constitutional interpretive
authority, however, unless such an announced nonacquiescence to Morrison
occurs ex ante, long preceding any specific occasion in which an independent
counsel is sought. See Paulsen, supra note 37 (arguing that a future Presi-
dent should pursue exactly such a course). Even in such event, a President
might feel obliged to appoint, through regulation (as in Nixon) an independent
counsel with the same authority as would be possessed under the assertedly
unconstitutional independent counsel statute. Indeed, the Reagan admini-
stration pursued such an approach as a "fallback" with respect to the ap-
pointment of Lawrence Walsh to investigate the Iran-Contra affair, in the
event that the Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government
[Vol. 83:473484
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How does this constitutional restructuring of the Article II
branch of government affect an executive branch attorney's du-
ties of confidentiality toward his governmental "client"? How
does it affect the attorney-client privilege of the United States
of America (that is, the executive branch)?44
Act were found unconstitutional in the then-pending litigation that eventually
resulted in the decision in Morrison. See Howard Kurtz, Suits Won't Halt
Probes, Officials Say; Justice Department Weighs Stand on Independent
Counsel Statute; The Crisis of the Reagan Presidency: Aftermath of the Tower
Report Series, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1987, at Al.
A regular practice, sustained over time, of appointing independent coun-
sel through the Department of Justice, by special regulation, and of refusing
to make such appointments under the Independent Counsel statute, might
effectively render Morrison a constitutional nullity and vindicate the position
taken in Justice Scalia's dissent. Cf John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review
by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Ra-
tional Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1993, at 292, 310 (discussing a similar strategy by the executive
branch with respect to the War Powers Resolution: "By refusing to enforce the
law, the President had effectively called Congress's bluff, both raising the
stakes and leaving Congress with no feasible way to make its law binding
through the use of its own political powers.").
44. As noted above, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct sup-
ply the starting point for analysis of a lawyer's duties of confidentiality with
respect to a client (including a governmental client), including the duty to in-
voke the attorney-client privilege to protect those client confidences covered
by the privilege. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. However, it is im-
portant to note several limitations on the authority and clarity with which the
Model Rules speak to a lawyer's professional duties of confidentiality in this
context.
First, compliance with professional codes like the Model Rules does not
exhaust a lawyer's ethical obligations under the law. See MODEL RULES, su-
pra note 1, at 5 (preamble) ("Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities
are prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive
and procedural law."). Substantive law often imposes important additional,
and sometimes conflicting, obligations, which have a superior claim to the
lawyer's obedience. Second, lawyers for the United States government are
subject to federal law governing their conduct, including regulations pre-
scribed by the Attorney General for the proper conduct of government law-
yers. See 28 C.F.R. § 5 (1997) (providing that the Attorney General shall
"[slupervise, and direct the administration and operation of the Department
of Justice, including the offices of U.S. Attorney and U.S. Marshals, which are
within the Department of Justice). While those regulations typically direct
that government lawyers be members of the bar of some state, and adhere to
that state's ethics rules, the laws and rules prescribed by Congress and the
Attorney General ultimately control the conduct of government attorneys.
See 9 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 71 (1985) (indicating that while attorneys may be
subject to ethical guidelines of states, the ultimate constraint on them is that
imposed by the Department of Justice, as well as federal law). Recent court
decisions have challenged this premise, however, holding that state or local
bar disciplinary rules are controlling and trump inconsistent regulations
promulgated by the Attorney General. See United States ex rel. O'Keefe v.
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Part of the answer to these questions lies in answering the
question of just who is the "client" of a governmental attorney
in the first place.45 In the In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum case, the Eighth Circuit spoke at length about the issue
of whether "The White House" possesses an attorney-client
privilege, apparently assuming that "The White House" is a
distinct legal entity with the capability of being a "client" with
its own attorney-client relationship separate and apart from
that of the United States government as a whole, and likewise
capable of possessing an attorney-client privilege of its own-
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that
Attorney General's regulation authorizing certain ex parte contacts with rep-
resented parties was not authorized by statute and thus did not affect appli-
cation of ethical rule against such contacts). Third, the Model Rules are only
models for the states, and even those states that have adopted the Rules
(rather than the old "Model Code," which is similar in some, but not all, re-
spects) have introduced important variations, especially with respect to a
lawyer's duty of confidentiality. Most of those variations are in the direction
of giving the lawyer an increased measure of discretion to reveal client confi-
dences in certain situations (i.e., client fraud in which the lawyer's services
were involved, and a client's intention to commit a future crime) or of impos-
ing an affirmative duty on the lawyer to disclose confidential information in
some circumstances. But some jurisdictions' rules impose greater obligations
of confidentiality and lesser obligations of candor to the court or to rectify cli-
ent fraud. Particularly significant in this regard are the Washington, D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct, which include some important provisions at
variance with the Model Rules (especially concerning confidentiality and cli-
ent perjury). D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990) [hereinafter D.C.
RULES]. Especially noteworthy is D.C. Rule 1.6(i), which provides, in the con-
text of the duty of confidentiality, that "[tihe client of the government lawyer
is the agency that employs the lawyer unless expressly provided to the con-
trary by appropriate law, regulation, or order." Id. For reasons set forth be-
low in the text, I believe that this is inaccurate as a matter of constitutional
law. The executive branch attorney's client is the United States government's
executive branch. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. This concep-
tion, not the D.C. Rules' seemingly inconsistent conception, necessarily gov-
erns the attorney-client relationship and duties of government attorneys. Un-
fortunately, the D.C. Rules constitute the governing body of professional rules
for many attorneys representing the government, by virtue of the fact of
membership in the D.C. Bar (either singly or in combination with another bar
membership) and by virtue of the Rules' choice-of-law provision, D.C. RULES,
supra, Rule 8.5; see also infra note 47.
45. My thinking in the following several paragraphs, and to some extent
throughout this article, has been very much influenced by Professor Geoffrey
P. Miller's fine essay, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV 1293, 1294-99 (1987), which rejects as
'incoherent" the notion that the government attorney serves some transcen-
dental "public interest" apart from that legitimately represented by officials
within the branch of government within which the lawyer is situated. See
also Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the
Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (1991).
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separate and apart from (and therefore, implicitly, assertable
against) the United States government as a whole, or some
other agency or separable "entity" within it.
Such an implication is badly misleading. Nomenclature
matters to clear-headed analysis, especially in identifying ex-
actly who is "the client" of an attorney representing a corporate
or other institutional entity in an organizational capacity, or in
some other "triangular" legal relationship. 46 The Eighth Cir-
cuit's sloppiness on this score affects its whole opinion, and it is
worth pausing to get this point right. (The D.C. Circuit, as I
explain below, did get this point right).
Does an attorney working in the White House Counsel's of-
fice represent (a) Bill Clinton, personally; (b) the President of
the United States (POTUS); (c) "the White House" (that is, as
an agency within the executive branch); (d) the United States
of America, or "USA, Inc." (that is, the United States govern-
ment, as embodied in its executive branch); or (e) "We the Peo-
ple of the United States" in some rarified meta-institutional
sense?
The answer that seems most appropriate, as a matter of
constitutional law-that is, as a matter of the constitutive law
of the legal entity in question-is "(d)": an attorney working for
an agency within the executive branch represents the govern-
ment of the United States of America (that is, the executive
branch).
The chief executive officer of the entity is the President of
the United States, but the attorney plainly does not represent
the purely personal, individual interests of the present occu-
pant of the office of President of the United States (so answer
"W(a)" is clearly wrong). Nor does the attorney represent "the
White House" as a legal personage or as an "agency" with a dis-
tinctive legal identity in its own right. It is clear, as a matter
of constitutional structure, that "the White House" is not an
agency or entity separate and apart from the United States
government. The "unitary executive" principle continues to
hold true as the organizing structure of Article II to the extent
not impaired by judicially-validated departures from that
46. For an analysis of the complexities and realities of such relationships,
and the need for care in identifying both the identity of the client and the sub-
stantive law governing the client's (and thus often the lawyer's) duties to oth-
ers, see Professor Hazard's important article, Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Trian-




structure in specific instances (like the Independent Counsel),
so that an attorney for one agency or division within the Ex-
ecutive Branch ultimately has as his or her client the Executive
Branch of the U.S. government.
The fact that an attorney's job responsibilities may concern
only a particular agency does not alter the fact that the attor-
ney's client is the United States of America, not the agency,
and that it is to that ultimate client that the attorney's duties
and obligations run, just as an attorney working within a par-
ticular department of a corporation probably (depending on the
corporation's charter, bylaws and procedures) has as his or her
client the corporation as a whole, and not the department or
division that is the focus of the attorney's legal work for the
corporation.47 Thus, a government lawyer in the Treasury De-
partment has, as his or her client, not the Treasury Depart-
ment or the Secretary of the Treasury, but the executive
branch of the United States government-which remains a
unitary executive, except to the extent altered by Morrison.
Answer "(c)"-"the White House"--the Eighth Circuit's appar-
ent conception, is thus plainly wrong.48
The D.C. Circuit's opinion in In re Lindsey avoids the
Eighth Circuit's conceptual sloppiness about whom the gov-
ernment attorney represents. From the outset, the D.C. Cir-
47. To the extent that D.C. Rule 1.6 reflects a different conception-that
the agency and not the executive branch as a whole is the government attor-
ney's client-that conception is wrong as a matter of law. See D.C. RULES,
supra note 44, Rule 1.6(i). The D.C. Rule-which provides that "[tihe client of
the government lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer unless ex-
pressly provided to the contrary by appropriate law, regulation, or order"-is
perhaps most sensibly construed as necessarily incorporating by reference the
constitutional law governing the structure of the executive branch of the
United States government. Id. While the hierarchical structure of Article II
(aside from the exception for an Independent Counsel recognized in Morrison)
is perhaps not quite an explicit "law, regulation, or order," it must be under-
stood as part of the constitutive law governing the attorney's relationship with
his governmental client. Certainly the reverse cannot be the case: The D.C.
Rule cannot take precedence over the Constitution's structure of government.
Such a reversal of the hierarchy of laws governing the lawyer would have the
local bar rule tail wagging the constitutional dog.
48. The use of the Treasury Department as an example is not accidental,
for supposed improper contact with Treasury officials concerning a Resolution
Trust Corporation (RTC) inquiry is part of what has been alleged to constitute
misconduct by executive branch officials in connection with Whitewater. But
it should follow from the reasoning in the text that there is nothing on its face
improper with White House officials talking with Treasury officials about a
matter of executive branch law enforcement.
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cult's opinion notes that posing the question presented prop-
erly-may a federal government attorney refuse to answer
questions in a federal grand jury investigation concerning pos-
sible criminal conduct by federal officials?-leads unavoidably
to a negative answer, for the simple reason that "the Office of
the President is a part of the federal government, consisting of
government employees doing government business."49
That is the key first step. The government lawyer's client
is not an individual or a subcomponent office within the gov-
ernment. The client is the United States government-that is,
the executive branch. Under Article II of the Constitution, one
can almost say that the President is the executive branch,
making "(b)"--White House Counsel lawyers represent the
President of the United States (POTUS)-the least-wrong
wrong answer. More precisely, though, the President possesses
the entirety of the constitutional power of the executive branch
under Article HI, and thus determines and speaks for the inter-
ests of the United States government as an entity (subject, of
course, to the exceptions carved out of Article II by the Su-
preme Court in Morrison). In corporate terms, the President is
a CEO who is not answerable to a separate Board of Directors,
and who serves a term of years by virtue of his election. He is
removable only by the process of impeachment, a decision that
lies within the province of an entirely separate branch of gov-
ernment that otherwise is constitutionally forbidden from exer-
cising direct control of the executive management of the United
States government. By virtue of separation of powers, and the
checks and balances that result from the interaction of the in-
dependent and shared powers of each branch, Congress pos-
sesses important practical and political checks on the Presi-
dent's manner of exercise of the executive power; but Congress
cannot itself acquire or subsume the executive power. 50
It follows from this principle of separation of powers that
an executive branch attorney's duty to the United States gov-
ernment as an entity lies to the executive authority of the
49. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
50. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (holding that Con-
gress cannot control the execution of the laws by assigning executive duties to
officer subject to removal by the legislative branch and not by the President).
On the independence of Congress's impeachment power, see Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 229-38 (1993).
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United States, not to Congress.5' Indeed, Congress may often
be the "adversary" (in a Madisonian, Federalist #51-ish sort of
way) of the United States government (understood as the ex-
ecutive authority of the United States). The Article H branch
might well have confidentiality interests vis-h-vis the Article I
branch, and an executive branch lawyer's duty is to the former,
not the latter.52 In this sense, it is hard to conceptualize the
executive branch lawyer's duty as running to some constitu-
ency outside of the executive (making "(e)" a wrong answer,
too). The President of the United States is the individual con-
stitutionally charged with speaking for the interests of the ex-
ecutive branch of the United States and the government attor-
ney is, in almost all circumstances, bound by the President's
determination as to what those interests are, just as subordi-
nate agencies within the executive branch are bound by the
President's determinations as to the interests of the executive.
51. Accord Mfiller, supra note 45, at 1296-99.
52. The President may or may not have a common law attorney-client
privilege as against Congress, enforceable by the courts. The existence and
scope of any privilege, as against Congress, would seem to be a question of the
procedures governing congressional hearings and investigations-matters
within the constitutional prerogative of Congress on which the authority of
courts to articulate "common law" rules would seem dubious at best. The
President might well assert a constitutional privilege thought to inhere in Ar-
ticle II as a defense to a demand for information by the Article I branch, but
these are matters probably best left to the political process of constitutional
tug-of-war between Congress and the President envisioned by the framers,
rather than resolved by the courts. Cf. Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13 CONST.
COMM. 346, 354-56 (1996) (reviewing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1994)). At all
events, the attorney-client privilege as a privilege distinct from executive
privilege is not of constitutional dimension.
In In re Lindsey, the D.C. Circuit considered President Clinton's argu-
ment that Lindsey should not be forced to testify before the grand jury if in-
formation from such testimony might thereafter be transmitted to Congress.
148 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W.
3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316). The court breezily remarked that there
is no certainty that Lindsey could be prevented from testifying before Con-
gress in any event, and also no certainty as to what rules and procedures
would apply in an impeachment proceeding. See id. at 1113. The fact of un-
certainty, however, is not responsive. If Congress could not compel such tes-
timony because of the existence of a constitutional executive privilege, to
permit Congress to obtain such testimony indirectly, by way of a statute re-
quiring the Independent Counsel to file a report with Congress, might well be
unconstitutional, even under Morrison, as it would effectively transform the
Independent Counsel into a functionary of Congress, not the executive. See
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 726-27. It is not clear that Morrison authorizes the In-
dependent Counsel to waive the executive branch's executive privilege or at-
torney-client privilege as against Congress.
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It is hard, but not impossible, to imagine exceptions: it is
possible that, in some circumstances, a lawyer may have an
ethical duty (or have discretion) to disclose to persons outside
the executive branch the President's breach of a duty to the
United States government that is likely to cause substantial
injury to the United States, if the highest authority empowered
to act on behalf of the organization-that is, the President-
persists in a course of conduct "that is clearly a violation of law
and is likely to result in substantial injury to the [United
States]."53 But this is not the usual case. Indeed, it is. an ex-
ception to the rules of confidentiality, applicable where the or-
ganizational client is controlled by persons who are violating
their responsibilities to the client. The fact that a President,
for example, might be violating the law does not make Con-
gress the executive branch lawyer's client; it means that the
duties of loyalty to the client-the executive branch-may in
such extraordinary circumstances permit or require disclosure
of that information to third parties (such as Congress, among
others) notwithstanding the desire of present management of
the client (the executive branch) that the information not be
disclosed.
But the situation of an Independent Counsel representing
the executive branch poses a much different problem, by virtue
of the constitutional holdings of Nixon and Morrison and the
fact of the appointment of an Independent Counsel in a par-
ticular matter. In a post-Morrison constitutional world, a gov-
53. MODEL RULES, supra note 1, Rule 1.13(c); see also id. Rule 1.13 (a).
Rule 1.13(a) prescribes the proper course of conduct for an attorney repre-
senting an organization confronted with misconduct by officers of that organi-
zation. It provides that, upon exhaustion of other options, the attorney "may
resign in accordance with Rule 1.16." (emphasis added). Rule 1.16 requires an
attorney to resign where continued representation would involve the attorney
in furthering a course of illegal conduct or otherwise constitute a violation of
the rules of professional conduct. See id. Rule 1.16 cmt. 2. Comment 16 to
Rule 1.6, the confidentiality rule, permits a lawyer withdrawing from a prior
representation to "withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation,
or the like," thus effectively permitting a form of stylized semi-disclosure. In
addition, Rule 1.6(b)(2)'s authorization of disclosure to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer, based on conduct in which
the client was involved, may permit more explicit disclosure of otherwise con-
fidential information when principals of an organizational client have commit-
ted conduct the nondisclosure of which might result in further damage to the
organization, and consequent liability to the non-disclosing attorney.
It is perhaps instructive that the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct do




ernment attorney's client remains the United States of Amer-
ica (USA, Inc.), but the executive interests of the United States
of America are not always subject to the determination and
plenary control of the President of the United States. For some
purposes, or on some subjects, the Chief Executive does not
control the exercise of the executive power of the United States
government and, indeed, may have little to say about such ex-
ercises (absent the extraordinary move of attempted removal of
an Independent Counsel or pre-emptive pardons for matters
within the Independent Counsel's purview).54 That is the
holding of Morrison, with direct reference to federal criminal
proceedings conducted by an Independent Counsel.
The constitutional analysis frames the question of who
controls the government's attorney-client privilege, but it does
not itself answer the question. To say that the President does
not have exclusive control over the executive power of the
United States in an Independent Counsel proceeding is not to
say that the Independent Counsel does have exclusive control
in such matters, and that such control extends to control of the
privilege. Such a claim would be too strong, in light of the
holding in United States v. Nixon.55 Nixon did not hold that
the President had transferred to the special prosecutor the
power to decide whether executive privilege should apply in a
particular instance; it held that the special prosecutor, by vir-
tue of the assignment to him of executive prosecutorial power
within a prescribed sphere, could contest the President's asser-
tion of a privilege (and that such a contest over whose claimed
interest better represented the interests of the United States
government in this matter was a "justiciable controversy" sus-
ceptible of judicial resolution, within the traditional context of
a motion to enforce a subpoena). The question framed by In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum and In re Lindsey is simi-
lar: who speaks for the interests of the United States in as-
serting or waiving governmental attorney-client privilege, in
the context of a federal grand jury investigation of high execu-
tive branch officials conducted by an Independent Counsel?56
54. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695-96.
55. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
56. In a provocative Wall Street Journal Op-Ed article, former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Douglas R. Cox argued that the Eighth Circuit's
opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum was right because
(according to the title of the article) "Ken Starr, Not Hillary Clinton, is the
'Client' Here," and that "[t]he administration was reduced to the circular ar-
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gument that the executive branch can assert the attorney-client privilege
against itself." Douglas R. Cox, Ken Starr, Not Hillary Clinton, Is the "Client"
Here, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1997 at A19. Mr. Cox continues:
For better or for worse, the independent counsel law places a portion
of the executive branch's prosecutorial power in the hands of the in-
dependent counsel.... [F]or the limited purposes of his investigation,
the independent counsel exercises the decision-making authority or-
dinarily exercised by the president. As a result, the independent
counsel is the government "client" to whom any government attorney-
client privilege belongs, and it is his decision whether to assert any
privilege.
Id.
With great respect to Mr. Cox (my former superior in the Department of
Justice), this analysis is not quite sufficient to warrant his conclusion (with
which I ultimately agree). The fact that prosecutorial power has been as-
signed to an Independent Counsel does not necessarily mean that the Inde-
pendent Counsel has also been assigned the power to waive the government's
privilege. If that were true, Nixon's complex judicial balancing test and provi-
sion for careful in camera inspection for evaluating executive privilege claims
would make no sense; Leon Jaworski could waive executive privilege when-
ever he deemed it appropriate, because (on Mr. Cox's argument) assignment
of prosecutorial power gave him plenary power to dispense with the privilege.
Similarly, the Independent Counsel law, like the Nixon decision, gives the In-
dependent Counsel the authority to "contest" claims of privilege invoked by
the President, not to whisk them away. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(5) (1994). At least
this one provision of the Independent Counsel statute makes sense: one surely
would not want to empower an Independent Counsel's desires to trump le-
gitimate executive branch foreign policy or military confidentiality interests,
without at least the intervention and in camera review of a judicial tribunal.
This was attempted by Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh in the Iran-
Contra investigation, and the Reagan administration's claim of executive
privilege ultimately prevailed. United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 150
(4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the Attorney General, not the Independent
Counsel, retains control over the protection of classified information); Appeal
of United States by the Attorney General, 887 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1989)
(describing Walsh's attempt to get classified information from former CIA Of-
ficer Fernandez); LAWRENCE E. WALSH, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL FOR IRAN/CONTRA MATTERS 109-10 (1993); LAWRENCE E. WALSH,
FIREWALL: THE IRAN-CONTRA CONSPIRACY AND COVERUP 180 (1997)
(describing the agreement between Walsh and the Attorney General in the
prosecution against Oliver North to drop counts of the indictment involving
classified information as long as the remaining counts could be tried).
Rather, the Nixon and Morrison decisions, and the Independent Counsel
statute, in effect assign resolution of privilege disputes between the President
and an Independent Counsel to the judiciary. The Independent Counsel is
authorized to contest claims of privilege, and the President's executive su-
premacy to speak finally for the interests of the United States is taken away,
but that does not mean that such disputes always must be resolved in favor of
the Independent Counsel, as Mr. Cox seems to argue. To reach that conclu-
sion requires a significant additional analytic step not supplied by Mr. Cox's
argument. See infra Part V (arguing that this step is a justified one).
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III. INRE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM
The Eighth Circuit's answer to this question was to com-
pare governmental attorney-client privilege to executive privi-
lege under Nixon, and to reject the former because Nixon re-
jected the latter, in the context of an Independent Counsel
subpoena for evidence relevant to a federal criminal proceed-
ing.57 Because executive privilege is of constitutional dimen-
sion, the court reasoned, and the claim failed in Nixon, a non-
constitutional common law attorney-client privilege would
likewise have to yield.5 8 This quasi-"a fortiori" argument ex-
posed the Eighth Circuit majority to the dissent's charge that if
Nixon was the standard, in camera inspection had to be the
procedure, with a specific showing of relevance and need also
required. 5
9
Both positions are wrong. While Nixon is relevant in es-
tablishing the constitutional framework within which ques-
tions of privilege now must be decided-that is, in its holding
implicitly rejecting presidential executive supremacy-
executive privilege and attorney-client privilege are simply two
different animals. Nixon's holding concerning the scope and
strength of the asserted constitutional privilege of the execu-
tive does not control the conceptually distinct question of the
existence of a common law attorney-client privilege for the
United States government as an organizational client. One
could coherently hold that there is no such thing as "executive
privilege" and yet recognize a common law attorney-client
privilege that would cover all or part of the same ground, in
practical effect. Conversely, one might conclude that attorney-
client privilege affords narrow protection in this context, but
that executive privilege should (notwithstanding Nixon) pro-
vide strong protection.60
57. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997). The D.C. Circuit made a somewhat
similar argument in In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
I address the D.C. Circuit's opinion below. See infra Part IV.
58. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 919.
59. See id. at 935-36 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
60. Ironically, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Clinton
administration early on abandoned any claim of executive privilege with re-
spect to the subpoenaed notes, probably because of the unlikelihood of success
in light of the Nixon Tapes case. However, in light of the Eighth Circuit's de-
cision on the scope of attorney-client privilege, the Clinton administration and
President Clinton's private attorneys repaired to executive privilege as the
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Institutional attorney-client privilege is a distinct claim,
having rather little to do with the fact that the particular insti-
tution in question is the United States government. (That fact
is relevant to the question of the particular "corporate officer"
who controls the decision whether to invoke the privilege, but
not the question of whether the privilege exists and what it
covers.) It is, rather, the corporate analogy of the Upjohn case
that is the correct one. Upjohn involved the claim by a corpo-
ration, responding to an IRS summons, to attorney-client
privilege with respect to communications made by subordinate
officers or employees (including persons outside the manage-
ment or "control group" of the company) to corporate counsel,
at the direction of management, in order to enable corporate
counsel to give legal advice to the corporation.61 The United
States Supreme Court recognized the privilege as embracing
such communications, and denied enforcement of the IRS
summons.62
Nothing about Upjohn on its face seems to limit its rea-
soning to corporations, as distinct from other organizational
clients, and the White House relied heavily on the Upjohn case
as supporting its position.63 The Eighth Circuit purported to
distinguish Upjohn on three grounds, none of which is par-
ticularly persuasive. First, the court observed that Upjohn, in
recognizing a broad corporate privilege embracing communica-
tions not just from senior management to counsel, but by lower
echelon officials and employees as well, emphasized the poten-
tial for such persons to embroil the entity in legal difficulties. 64
privilege djour for resisting Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's grand jury
subpoenas for testimony by presidential advisers in the White House Coun-
sel's office. See John M. Broder, Clinton's Lawyers Seek Broader Ruling on
Privilege, N.Y. TZIES, March 25, 1998, at A21 (discussing the Clinton admini-
stration's decision to invoke executive privilege, not governmental attorney-
client privilege, as to conversations involving Deputy White House Counsel
Bruce Lindsey). But then, in a kind of "double reverse," Clinton's lawyers
abandoned the executive privilege claim before the D.C. Circuit in order to
avoid the prospect of immediate Supreme Court review, see Peter Blake, Clin-
ton May Drop Appeal on Privilege; Strategy Could Avert Supreme Court Re-
view, WASH. POST, June 1, 1998, at Al; Clinton to Limit Legal Appeal; Execu-
tive Privilege Claim to be Dropped, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 1998, at 1, and went
back to the attorney-client privilege claim that had been unsuccessfully pur-
sued in the Eighth Circuit.
6L See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386-88 (1981).
62. See id. at 397.
63. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 919.
64. See id. at 920.
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Not so for the White House, the Eighth Circuit argued, because
"the actions of White House personnel, whatever their capacity,
cannot expose the White House as an entity to criminal liabil-
ity" or to civil liability.65 Corporate counsel "have a compelling
interest in ferreting out any misconduct by employees." 66 But
"[tihe White House simply has no such interest with respect to
the actions of Mrs. Clinton."67
This makes no sense. For starters, the opinion relies upon
the awkward and mistaken formulation that it is "the White
House" that is the relevant client. The fact that this descrip-
tion of the "entity" also describes a piece of real estate makes
the court's argument sound stronger than it really is, for it is of
course true that Ken Starr is not looking to indict a building
standing at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. But if the client is un-
derstood as "the United States" it is far from absurd to think of
that entity as having very broad interests in obtaining infor-
mation concerning the conduct of its officers and employees.
The United States is sued all the time for actions of its officers
and employees. The United States has undertaken a legal
duty to provide representation in certain circumstances to offi-
cers or employees who become embroiled in legal proceedings
as a consequence of their governmental employment.68 It is
simply not the case that the United States does not have an in-
terest in the possible misconduct of its officials. Lawyers rep-
resenting the United States, like any other in-house counsel,
need to know of such possible misconduct by officers and em-
ployees in order to effectively represent the interest of their cli-
ent.
It requires an exceedingly narrow view of the potential le-
gal interests of an organizational client to assume that no such
interests exist if the organization itself is unlikely to be in-
dicted or charged, and Upjohn does not take such a grudging
attitude. The reason a broad band of communications to coun-
sel are treated as privileged is because it will enable counsel to
give legal advice to the corporation concerning possible courses
of conduct to pursue, in light of the information gathered.69 To
be sure, knowing your client could be sued or indicted based on
the actions of the client's employees concentrates the mind
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 919-21.
68. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1997).
69. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
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powerfully and might give a special sense of urgency to the le-
gal advice. But that does not exhaust the range of situations in
which legal guidance to the entity might be useful. Suppose
that employee malefactors have engaged in a course of repre-
hensible conduct for which there is no reasonable likelihood
that the entity will be asked to bear legal responsibility in any
way. Information about the conduct might be relevant to legal
advice about whether the employee could be fired by the entity
on this ground, without risking suit from the chagrined em-
ployee. Hillary Clinton would, of course, be a hard person for
the United States government to "fire" (especially since she is
not actually drawing a salary).7 0 But the Eighth Circuit's rea-
soning is cast broadly, and its conclusion is the broad one that
the privilege does not exist in the context of a federal criminal
investigation. The analysis leading to that conclusion does not
persuasively distinguish the policies that animated the Upjohn
opinion, at least not on the ground that the United States lacks
any legal "interest" in its employees' actions that would justify
resort to the common law privilege.
Finally, at the time of the communication, it is hard for the
government attorney to know whether the matter will implicate
a legal interest of the United States. As with attorneys repre-
senting a corporation, discussed in Upjohn, the first task of the
government lawyer in such a situation should be to "ascer-
tain[ ] the factual background and sift[ ] through the facts with
an eye to the legally relevant."7' This "ascertaining and sift-
ing" function requires communications from representatives of
the client, and Upjohn held that encouraging such communica-
tions warrants according them the protections of the attorney-
client privilege.7 2 Upjohn's reasoning on this score applies no
less to the government attorney than to the corporate attorney.
The Eighth Circuit's second argument against application
of Upjohn is better, but too narrow: "We also find it significant
that executive branch employees, including attorneys, are un-
der a statutory duty to report criminal wrongdoing by other
70. Others have questioned this point, however. See Robert A. Schapiro
& Michael J. Broyde, Impeachment and Accountability: The Case of the First
Lady, 15 CONST. COMM. 479 (1998); Carl D. Wasserman, Note, Firing the
First Lady: The Role and Accountability of the Presidential Spouse, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 1215 (1995).
71. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91.
72. See id. at 397.
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employees to the Attorney General."73 That is all the court
makes of the point. One could fairly argue that the crime-
reporting mandate constitutes a statutory abrogation of any
common law attorney-client privilege with respect to communi-
cations by government employees to government attorneys
concerning not only crimes an employee has committed but,
more broadly, in the literal words of the statute,
"information... relating to violations" by employees of federal
criminal law. (Indeed, the Independent Counsel, in his brief in
opposition to certiorari, rested heavily on exactly such a
broader section 535(b) argument.) 4 The Eighth Circuit's
treatment of the statute-as imposing a duty merely to report
"criminal wrongdoing"-would only require the White House
Counsel's office to report to the Attorney General Hillary Clin-
ton's confessions of criminal wrongdoing (or statements that
would lead the government attorneys to believe that Mrs. Clin-
ton had engaged in criminal wrongdoing); it would not consti-
tute grounds for any broader waiver of the privilege. Thus, the
court's reliance on section 535(b) does not get it all the way to
its conclusion, for the Eighth Circuit's judgment did not rest on
the fact that the notes reflect incriminating statements by
Hillary Clinton. The court did not look at the notes.5 Rather,
the court held that Ken Starr gets the notes no matter what is
in them.7 6
The Eighth Circuit's treatment of section 535(b) as a help-
ful policy "push" against application of the privilege in federal
grand jury proceedings simply will not do the job. It helps a
wee bit, but it does not justify the court's ultimate conclusion
because it does not persuasively distinguish Upjohn as a mat-
ter of practical policy considerations and common law. A cor-
poration might have a similar internal rule that corporate em-
ployees are obliged to report wrongdoing by fellow employees.
Indeed, the information gathered by Upjohn's general counsel,
in the Upjohn case, was done at the direction of the CEO, car-
73. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 920 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
(1994)).
74. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 11-16, Office of the
President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-
1783).
75. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 914.
76. See id. at 923-24.
78. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-89.
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rying with it the implicit requirement that corporate employees
comply with the internal investigation.78 In essence, Upjohn
had its own in-house version of section 535(b), and that did not
affect the Court's decision to recognize the corporation's com-
mon law privilege with respect to the communications received.
The existence of an in-house duty of employees to provide in-
formation to the corporation's counsel, as a condition of the
employee's employment, does not render such communications
outside the scope of the corporation's attorney-client privilege,
under Upjohn.
Thus, for section 535(b) to justify a different result from
Upjohn requires reading the statute far more aggressively-as
the Independent Counsel did in his opposition to certiorari 79-
as affirmatively abrogating the common law privilege for all
communications made by government employees to govern-
ment lawyers (other than those lawyers appointed to serve as
individual counsel for the employee, not as counsel for the gov-
ernment in the matter) that contain any "information ... relat-
ing to" violations of criminal law by law enforcement officials.
If the statute abrogates the privilege, that is the end of the
matter. Upjohn is common law, and Congress may prescribe
by statute a different rule for communications to government
employees.
The difficulty lies in the assertion that 28 U.S.C. § 535(b)
really is a statutory abrogation of attorney-client privilege.
Whether this is so depends a lot on how strong a "clear state-
ment" is thought to be required for statutes departing from the
common law.80 A possible "plain-text" reading is that the re-
porting duty applies to all government employees, that attor-
neys are not in terms excepted, and that communications oth-
erwise privileged are not excepted either.8' But section 535(b)
79. Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 23-24, Office of the
President v. Office of Independent Counsel, 117 S.Ct. 2482 (1997) (No. 96-
1783).
80. The traditional rule is that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly construed. Several important Supreme Court cases rely on
this notion, directly or implicitly. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
832-33 (1985); Norfolk Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. Chesapeake & Poto-
mac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983); Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 622-23 (1812); cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989). For an insightful discussion, treating the traditional
canon as of a piece with the canon against statutory repeals-by-implication,
see David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 921,936-37 (1992).
81. The D.C. Circuit in the Lindsey case, however, appeared to accept (at
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certainly could be read as merely imposing an in-house re-
porting duty, much like Upjohn's directive to its employees to
cooperate in its general counsel's internal investigation. In
many ways, that is the more natural understanding of the lan-
guage chosen in section 535(b), and the reading that better co-
heres with Congress's subsequent decision to allow the courts
to develop the common law of privilege, in Rule 501 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. (Section 535(b) was enacted in 1954;
Rule 501 was adopted in 1974.) In context, one would expect
that a privilege-abrogating statute would use more specific
privilege-abrogating language.
Perhaps the best test of whether section 535(b) establishes
an executive branch in-house reporting requirement only, or
instead abrogates executive attorney-client privilege, is to ask
how the statute most naturally would be understood in the
context of a congressional subpoena of communications made
by executive branch employees to executive branch attorneys
for purposes of enabling the Attorney General (and other ex-
ecutive branch attorneys) to advise the executive branch con-
cerning legal matters. If the statute is merely an internal
housekeeping matter, whatever attorney-client privilege the
executive branch possesses as against Congress would still
hold. If the statute is an abrogation of the common law, no
such privilege exists (unless the executive branch has a consti-
tutional basis for refusing to provide the requested informa-
tion). Push the hypothetical a step further: how would section
535(b) be interpreted in the context of a private litigant's dis-
covery demand for such communications in a civil suit against
the United States? Would it be construed as effecting a gen-
eral abrogation or waiver of the executive branch's attorney-
client privilege? I have little doubt that the statute would not
be so construed, as against parties outside the executive branch
(including Congress). If that intuition is correct, it would seem
to follow that section 535(b) is an intra-executive duty imposed
on government employees, not a statute that abrogates any
common law attorney-client privilege possessed by the execu-
tive branch as an entity.
least for purposes of argument) President Clinton's argument that 28 U.S.C. §
535(b) does not in terms apply to the Office of the President. See In re Lind-
sey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 67




The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the statute discusses none
of these difficulties, but consists of nothing more than a pass-
ing reference to the statute as support for the argument to
which the court next turns-a general public policy interest fa-
voring disclosure in the governmental context.82 It is in this
third and final proposed distinction of Upjohn that the Eighth
Circuit begins to grope, haltingly, toward a more persuasive
rationale for its holding. "[Tihe general duty of public service,"
the court wrote, "calls upon government employees and agen-
cies to favor disclosure over concealment. The difference be-
tween the public interest and the private interest is perhaps,
by itself, reason enough to find Upjohn unpersuasive in this
case."83
Perhaps. But perhaps not: the premise of Upjohn is that
an organization's attorney-client privilege serves valuable pub-
lic purposes of facilitating "the observance of law and admini-
stration of justice" in enabling the attorney to provide sound
legal advice to the organization. 84 "The privilege recognizes
that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that
such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client."S5 If this reasoning is sound, one would
expect that the privilege should be regarded as especially im-
portant in the governmental context. Nowhere else is the pub-
lic interest in "observance of law and administration of justice"
more critical than in the administration of government. If the
privilege facilitates those public purposes (as Upjohn main-
tains), that is not a reason to limit it in the governmental con-
text. If anything, it would be a reason for a court to be more
generous in its treatment of the privilege in such a context.
The Eighth Circuit may have had something more precise
in mind, however. It quoted the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., rejecting work product
immunity for accountants and talking about the "public watch-
dog" function performed by independent accountants.8 6 Then,
in the most persuasive argument of its opinion, the Eighth Cir-
cuit built on Arthur Young and drew a comparison with the
public responsibilities of government attorneys:
82. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 920.
83. Id.
84. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
85. Id.
86. 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The public responsibilities of the White House are, of course, far
greater than those of a private accountant performing a service with
public implications. We believe the strong public interest in honest
government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be
ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege
applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public
officials. We also believe that to allow any part of the federal govern-
ment to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production
of information relevant to a federal criminal investigation would rep-
resent a gross misuse of public assets.
87
This passage contains the kernel of truth that makes the
result in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum correct: the
context of a federal criminal investigation of federal officials
believed likely to have violated laws of the United States, con-
ducted by a duly-appointed Independent Counsel acting on be-
half of the United States, demands some limitation on the
power of the officials under investigation to invoke the attor-
ney-client privilege of the United States against investigators
and prosecutors of the United States legitimately pursuing a
criminal investigation within their assigned jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit did not put it quite this way. There is,
moreover, much chaff in the opinion that obscures this insight,
but the essential point is there. But once the opinion's mis-
takes and clutter are cleared away, the court's holding can be
seen as an embryonic attempt to fashion what I will call a
"Government Garner" doctrine. But that understanding of the
Eighth Circuit's result only makes sense if one embraces,
rather than eschews, the analogy to the attorney-client privi-
lege as it exists in the corporate context.88
87. 112 F.3d at 921 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Interestingly,
this point is the only proposition for which the D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey
cited the Eighth Circuit's opinion. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1110.
88. In addition to the points previously noted, the Eighth Circuit erred
badly, and unnecessarily, in its discussion of the "common interest" doctrine.
That doctrine recognizes that the privilege is not lost by virtue of disclosure of
attorney-client communications to, or discussions among, co-parties (and
counsel) who possess a common legal interest or objective, or who are litigat-
ing against a common adversary. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). The White
House argued that the government and Mrs. Clinton possess common inter-
ests of such a nature, and that conversations involving Mrs. Clinton, her pri-
vate attorneys, and government attorneys are covered by this branch of the
privilege. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 922-23.
The problem with the argument is that, even if otherwise valid, it does
not alter the central question of who controls the privilege. If, in legal effect,
Hillary Clinton was speaking to "the United States" when she was speaking to
White House Counsel, "the United States" already owns and possesses the
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notes made from this meeting. The only question is which official of the
United States gets to decide whether the notes will be made available to the
grand jury-the Independent Counsel or the President (or his designee). The
common interest doctrine would not alter the fact that Hillary Clinton had
already voluntarily disclosed this information to the co-party (the United
States) with whom she ostensibly shared the common interest. The Eighth
Circuit noted as much, drolly observing that the argument "begs the question
we are called upon to decide." Id. at 922.
The Eighth Circuit then went on to hold, superfluously and almost ab-
surdly, that there is no commonality of interest between Hillary Clinton and
the White House: "Mrs. Clinton's interest... is, naturally, avoiding prosecu-
tion .... One searches in vain for any interest of the White House which cor-
responds to Mrs. Clinton's personal interest .... Because ... the White House
and Mrs. Clinton have failed to establish that the interests of the Republic
coincide with her personal interests," the court wrote, the invocation of the
common interest doctrine "must fail." Id. at 922-23. The mistake here is in
thinking that the common interest doctrine requires complete congruence of
the two parties' interests, rather than simply a significant enough overlap of
interests that the parties think that shared confidences are worth the risk.
One need not believe that "what's good for Hillary is good for the country" to
recognize that the United States government (the relevant co-party) may have
significant legal interests in common with the personal interests of the spouse
of the present President of the United States, arising out of conduct occurring
in the White House and potentially involving government personnel. For that
matter, the premise behind the government's provision of representation, in
some circumstances and under certain conditions, to employees who are sued,
subpoenaed, or charged for conduct in connection with their government em-
ployment, is that the government may have interests in common with such
employees. At the same time, the government may have interests in opposi-
tion to those of the employee, which is why representation of the employee
generally is provided by counsel not representing the United States, and why
representation or reimbursement may ultimately be denied in some instances.
See 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 (1997); 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 54 (1989). Surely,
whatever interest could in theory justify the government in paying for an offi-
cer's or employee's private legal representation would similarly support appli-
cation of the "common interest" doctrine. The problem for Hillary Clinton
here is that her co-party, upon hearing her statements, decided it might wish
to use those statements against her, and no binding agreement with the
United States (in the person of the official with final decisionmaking authority
on this question, Kenneth Starr) existed to prevent them from doing so.
On one point the Eighth Circuit was clearly right. The last section of the
court's opinion analyzing the privilege claim rightly rejects the outrageous ar-
gument (incredibly, accepted by the district court) that Mrs. Clinton's as-
serted "reasonable belief" that the communications would be privileged some-
how makes them privileged. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 112 F.3d at
923. The Eighth Circuit noted that the cases relied on by the White House all
involved "reasonable mistakes of fact" and that Hillary Clinton's argument
was essentially "that a client's beliefs, subjective or objective, about the law of
privilege can transform an otherwise unprivileged conversation into a privi-
leged one." Id. To state the proposition is to refute it. The Eighth Circuit
correctly stated the proposition.
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IV. IN RE LINDSEY
Presented with essentially the same issue, the D.C. Circuit
in In re Lindsey embraced the Upjohn corporate privilege anal-
ogy in the course of rejecting President Clinton's claim of gov-
ernmental attorney-client privilege with respect to his conver-
sations with his Deputy White House Counsel (and long-time
confidant) Bruce Lindsey.89 The D.C. Circuit's opinion, how-
ever, addressed the corporate analogy only obliquely, as part of
its policy balancing of the costs and benefits of recognizing the
privilege in the context of a federal criminal investigation of
federal officials, not as a point central to the analysis. 90 The
D.C. Circuit's opinion, while avoiding some of the problems
with the Eighth Circuit's analysis, likewise focused primarily
on whether "reason and experience"-that is, policy-support
recognition of the common law attorney-client privilege in this
distinctive context.91
The stakes were arguably higher in In re Lindsey than in
the Hillary Clinton case. The conversations for which the In-
dependent Counsel sought the testimony of Bruce Lindsey in-
cluded communications by the President of the United States
to an attorney in the White House Counsel's office acting (at
least as to some of these conversations) in his capacity as a
government attorney,92 for purposes of obtaining legal advice
concerning conduct in which the President engaged while in of-
fice (possible peijury and obstruction of justice) and discussing
what actions might be taken by the President in light of these
legal difficulties, all of which could have serious consequences
for the United States government (including possible im-
89. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1111-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1104, 1108 (referencing Federal Rules of Evidence 501's
standard that courts should interpret privileges "in light of reason and experi-
ence").
92. The court noted that several of the conversations on which Bruce
Lindsey invoked attorney-client privilege did not involve Lindsey acting in his
capacity as an attorney, but concerned political or policy issues only, or in-
volved legal advice given to President Clinton in a purely personal capacity
(concerning the Paula Jones lawsuit) and thus did not fall within Wigmore's
traditional description of the privilege. See id. at 1106. Nonetheless, the
court stated that "[wie have little doubt that at least one of Lindsey's conver-
sations subject to grand jury questioning 'concerned the seeking of legal ad-
vice' and was between President Clinton and Lindsey or between others in the
White House and Lindsey while Lindsey was 'acting in his professional capac-
ity' as an attorney." Id. at 1107.
[Vol. 83:473504
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
peachment of the President). Assuming arguendo that the
communications concerned requests for legitimate legal advice
and would not fall within the crime-fraud exception for com-
munications made for the purpose of facilitating ongoing or fu-
ture criminal activity (a matter on which the facts are not pub-
licly known as of the time this article goes to print), the
communications at issue would seem to fall within the very
core of executive attorney-client privilege. The proper ques-
tion, however, is not whether the privilege exists, but who con-
trols its assertion or waiver.
That is not the way the D.C. Circuit majority framed the
issue. Like the Eighth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit in In re Lind-
sey conceived of the question as whether government attorney-
client privilege should exist in the first place, in this particular
context.93 The difference is subtle, but potentially important,
for while the D.C. Circuit's ultimate conclusion is sound, to the
extent its holding rests on questions of policy and judgment
rather than on the executive branch governance structure that
exists as a matter of law in a post-Morrison constitutional
world, the holding is vulnerable. Reasonable minds can differ
as to the policy question of whether government officials
should possess an attorney-client privilege covering communi-
cations to government lawyers for purposes of obtaining
(presumably) legitimate legal advice, as against a federal
grand jury inquiry. But the question of control over the privi-
lege-the power to waive or override it-is a question not of
judgment but of analysis and application of the corporate by-
laws and statutes of USA, Inc., to ascertain how the lines of
authority are drawn concerning this matter.
The D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth, started with an analogy
to United States v. Nixon.94 President Nixon lost his claim for
executive privilege as against a specific subpoena for evidence
in a federal criminal proceeding brought by an independent
prosecutor on behalf of the United States, so why should Presi-
dent Clinton's claim of executive attorney-client privilege in
93. See id. at 1102 ("[N]either legal authority nor policy nor experience
suggests that a federal government entity can maintain the ordinary common
law attorney-client privilege to withhold information relating to a federal
criminal offense."); id. at 1108 (stating the question as "whether, in the first
instance, the privilege extends as far as the Office of the President would
like," and stating the court's task in terms of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as one of interpreting privileges in light of reason and experience).
94 See id. at 1102 (citingNixon).
1998]
506 MINNESOTA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 83:473
the same type of context receive more respect? "[Tihere is no
basis for treating legal advice differently from any other advice
the Office of the President receives in performing its constitu-
tional functions," wrote the D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey.9 5
A President often has private conversations with his Vice President
or his Cabinet Secretaries or other members of the Administration
who are not lawyers or who are lawyers, but are not providing legal
services. The advice these officials give the President is of vital im-
portance to the security and prosperity of the nation, and to the
President's discharge of his constitutional difficulties. Yet upon a
proper showing, such conversations must be revealed in federal
criminal proceedings. 6
The court continued with a particularly effective barb:
Only a certain conceit among those admitted to the bar could explain
why legal advice should be on a higher plane than advice about pol-
icy, or politics, or why a President's conversation with the most junior
lawyer in the White House Counsel's Office is deserving of more pro-
tection from disclosure in a grand jury investigation than a Presi-
dent's discussions with his Vice President or a Cabinet Secretary. In
short, we do not believe that lawyers are more important to the op-
eration of government than all other officials, or that the advice law-
yers render is more crucial to the functioning of the Presidency than
the advice coming from all other quarters.
97
It's hard to argue with that-at least not without appear-
ing to be a conceited lawyer. Judge Tatel, dissenting, did ar-
gue with the majority on this point, however, and his argument
is not without persuasive force. The attorney-client privilege,
Judge Tatel wrote, "rests not, as my colleagues put it, on some
'conceit' that 'lawyers are more important to the operations of
government than all other officials'... but rather on the spe-
cial nature of legal advice, and its special need for confidenti-
ality, as recognized by centuries of common law."98 Citing Up-
john, Judge Tatel argued that the purpose of the privilege is to
"enable[ ] the lawyer as an officer of the court properly to ad-
vise the client, including facilitating compliance with the
law."99
President Clinton's subsequent public admissions invite
the cynical response that, in this case at least, the attorney-
client privilege appears to have been a device for obstructing
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1114 (citations omitted).
97. Id.




access to evidence of probable crimes, not "facilitating compli-
ance with the law."100 In terms of the law as set forth in Up-
john, however, Judge Tatel was right. The theory of the attor-
ney-client privilege is that complete confidentiality will induce
candor which will produce competent counsel which will induce
compliance with law. While one can disagree with that theory
(and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that poor legal
"ethics" justifies some cynicism about this ideal chain-of-
causation), the theory rests not on a claim that lawyers' advice
is more important than anybody else's, but that it is different.
Because persons seeking legal advice often have very real legal
problems, resulting from their own questionable conduct, the
occasions that call for such advice are perhaps less likely than
most other situations (maybe even including Cabinet meetings)
to produce complete candor by the person needing advice and
the person giving it, if confidentiality cannot be assured.
Moreover, even if one does not accept that legal advice
calls for greater protection of confidentiality than advice to the
President on matters of national policy or politics, it might as
easily be concluded that Nixon was too miserly in its protection
of executive branch deliberative privilege, not that the attor-
ney-client privilege is too generous. While it would seem ab-
surd to say that the outcome in Nixon could be circumvented
simply by making all executive branch advisers lawyers in the
Office of Counsel to the President, it seems too much a de-
bater's point to say that attorney-client privilege should be
given a narrow reading because executive privilege already
has. The law has endured worse anomalies.101
100. In light of President Clinton's partial public admissions and his grand
jury testimony, it may be the case that sufficient evidence exists to bring his
communications with Lindsey within the "crime-fraud" exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege in any event. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554
(1989); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). If so,
the specific information supporting such a claim is not now publicly known.
Moreover, a potentially insurmountable barrier exists to showing the crime-
fraud exception in this context. If the privilege at issue is the government's
attorney-client privilege, the United States government has not sought counsel
for purposes of furthering a crime, the governmental officer has. See In re
Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also infra Part V.
In any event, establishing grounds for invoking the crime-fraud exception
to the privilege is far more difficult as a general proposition than, in a case
such as this one, simply to prevail on the argument that as a matter of law the
privilege either does not exist or cannot overcome a grand jury subpoena in a
federal criminal investigation.
101. See also supra text accompanying notes 55-60 (discussing Nixon). As
I argue elsewhere, the correct answer is that Nixon was wrong on the scope of
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The D.C. Circuit's more persuasive analysis centered on
the statutory role of the Independent Counsel and the statu-
tory policy of 28 U.S.C. § 535(b). "[Tlhe Independent Counsel
is by statute an officer of the executive branch representing the
United States," the court wrote. "For matters within his juris-
diction, the Independent Counsel acts in the role of the Attor-
ney General as the country's chief law enforcement officer." 10 2
The court was referring to the statutory responsibilities of
the Attorney General. As a constitutional matter, of course,
the President is the nation's chief law enforcement officer. But
the court's essential point was correct: when one office of the
executive branch (the "Office of the President") resists a sub-
poena from another, analysis of whether a privilege exists
"'should take account of the complex considerations of govern-
mental structure, tradition, and regulation that are in-
volved." 103 Though the court did not say so explicitly, the real-
ity of governmental structure here is that the Independent
Counsel statute does make the Independent Counsel the na-
tion's chief law enforcement officer in the matters within his
jurisdiction, that such authority constitutionally may displace
the President's unless and until the Independent Counsel's
authority is terminated (Nixon, Morrison), and that the Inde-
pendent Counsel has full authority to contest the President's
(or any other officer's) claim of testimonial or evidentiary
privilege.10
4
executive privilege, and that the correct formulation of the scope of that
privilege should be very much parallel to that accorded the traditional com-
mon law attorney-client privilege. See Paulsen, supra note 37.
102. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1107 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1994)).
103. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 124 cmt. B (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)).
104. Independent Counsel Starr subpoenaed President Clinton to testify
before the grand jury. Rather than resist the subpoena, Clinton agreed to tes-
tify before the grand jury because he had "nothing to bide" and Starr agreed
to withdraw the subpoena. See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Clinton Agrees
to Testify for Grand Jury, WASH. POST, July 31, 1998, at Al. In light of Clin-
ton's subsequent refusal to answer certain questions, it is possible that Starr
could again issue a subpoena to the President. Press reports reflected discus-
sion of whether the President constitutionally can be compelled to testify be-
fore a federal grand jury. If Nixon is the law, the question is not difficult: the
President is fully amenable to judicial process, upon a sufficient showing of
justification. Physical evidence and testimonial evidence would appear to
stand on no different ground in this regard. See also Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 581 (1997) (unanimously holding that the President enjoys no constitu-
tional privilege or immunity against being required to appear and defend a
civil lawsuit in which he is a defendant while he is serving as President).
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If the Independent Counsel is the nation's chief law en-
forcement officer, the Deputy White House Counsel is, in a
sense, his subordinate. That would seem almost to settle the
matter. The In re Lindsey opinion then took a rather different
turn, however, noting the absence of controlling precedent, and
proceeding to treat the question as one of balancing various
policy considerations-of which the authority of the Independ-
ent Counsel as the chief law enforcement official of the United
States was but one. The core of the D.C. Circuit's holding can
be found in one important paragraph, blending considerations
of constitutional structure and legal ethics:
When an executive branch attorney is called before a federal
grand jury to give evidence about alleged crimes within the executive
branch, reason and experience, duty, and tradition dictate the attor-
ney shall provide the evidence. With respect to investigations of fed-
eral criminal offenses, and especially offenses committed by those in
government, government attorneys stand in a far different position
from members of the private bar. Their duty is not to defend clients
against criminal charges and it is not to protect wrongdoers from
public exposure. The constitutional responsibility of the President,
and all members of the Executive Branch, is to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." Investigation and prosecution of fed-
eral crimes is one of the most important and essential functions
within that constitutional responsibility. Each of our Presidents has,
in the words of the Constitution, sworn that he "will faithfully exe-
cute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best
of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States." And for more than two hundred years, each officer of
the Executive Branch has been bound by oath or affirmation to do the
same. This is a solemn undertaking, a binding of the person to the
cause of constitutional government, an expression of the individual's
allegiance to the principles embodied in that document. Unlike a pri-
vate practitioner, the loyalties of a government lawyer therefore can-
not and must not lie solely with his or her client agency.",,
Given the timing and circumstances of the opinion-July
27, 1998, following denial of the Clinton administration's
claims of a Secret Service privilege by another panel of the D.C.
Circuit, 106 unanimous denial of rehearing en banc and denial of
a stay by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 10 7 and in the face of mount-
ing public evidence of the falsity of President Clinton's prior
public statements concerning his sexual encounters with Mon-
105. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108 (citations omitted).
106. See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 67
U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-93).
107. See Office of the President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, App.
No. A-108, 1998 WL 438524, at *1 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1998) (denying stay); In re
Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (denying en banc rehearing).
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ica Lewinsky and his half-year long effort to thwart the Inde-
pendent Counsel's investigation into whether Clinton lied
about this matter under oath in a federal court proceeding-
one cannot help but read the D.C. Circuit's language here as a
pointed civics lesson to the President and to his administration
colleagues, especially lawyers: the government lawyer's duty is
to the United States government, its Constitution, and its laws,
not to individual officers of that government who violate the
law and attempt to deploy government lawyers to assist in
evading detection of such violations. "This view of the proper
allegiance of the government lawyer is complemented by the
public's interest in uncovering illegality among its elected and
appointed officials." 108
The point could not have been more clear: Deputy White
House Counsel Bruce Lindsey had an ethical duty and public
responsibility to the United States to disclose information con-
cerning possible federal criminal conduct by government offi-
cials, including the President, when that information came to
him in his role as an attorney representing the United States
government.10 9 Such a duty made it improper for him to com-
ply with the President's desire that he assert attorney-client
privilege as against a federal grand jury investigation con-
ducted by an independent counsel. And, by implication, the
existence of such a duty helped make clear to the court that
"reason and experience, duty, and tradition" counseled against
recognition of the asserted privilege in such circumstances.
The point is only fully persuasive on the issue presented,
however, if that issue is framed as who controls the assertion of
privilege: may the Office of the President invoke governmental
attorney-client privilege against the highest law enforcement
official of the United States government? It is less persuasive
if the question is whether a governmental privilege exists that
covers the communication in question. As with section 535, the
existence of an in-house reporting duty to the General Counsel
108. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1109; see also id. (noting that "before an
attorney in the Justice Department can step into the shoes of private counsel
to represent a federal employee sued in his or her individual capacity, the At-
torney General must determine whether the representation would be in the
interest of the United States").
109. For a general discussion of the problem of government attorneys' pos-
sible complicity in unlawful conduct by officials in the Clinton administration,
see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Government Lawyers:




for USA, Inc. does not constitute an abrogation of USA, Inc.'s
"corporate" attorney-client privilege as against everybody. The
ethical duty of executive branch officers under Article II of the
Constitution is to the Article II branch of government, not to
Congress or the public.1 0 The factor that is most crucial to
overcoming the privilege, therefore, is not the existence of ethi-
cal duties on the part of government lawyers, but the fact that
that ethical duty is owed to the Independent Counsel, as the
highest law enforcement authority of the United States. The
D.C. Circuit mentions both "factors," but does not clearly con-
nect them.
The rest of the In re Lindsey opinion is almost anticlimac-
tic. The D.C. Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, considered 28
U.S.C. § 535, the statute imposing a duty to inform the Attor-
ney General of possible criminal law violations by federal offi-
cials, to be relevant in terms of showing a general policy fa-
voring disclosure. (Indeed, the D.C. Circuit suggested that the
statute "does not clearly apply to the Office of the President" at
all, since that Office is technically neither a "department" nor
an "agency.")"'
The court then proceeded to weigh the public interest in
disclosure against the need for confidentiality in government
officials' conversations with government lawyers, assuming for
the sake of argument that its holding would "chill some com-
munications" but noting that these same fears were discounted
in the Nixon Tapes case. 12 It was at this point that the court,
for the first time and almost as an afterthought, made a pass-
ing reference to implied waiver of the privilege in certain intra-
corporate litigation, as presenting analogous situations where
confidentiality is not absolute:
110. See Miller, supra note 45, at 1296. The D.C. Circuit in In re Lindsey
appeared to recognize as much, quoting with approval from Federal Bar Asso-
ciation Ethics Committee, The Government Client and Confidentiality: Opin-
ion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973):
Each part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent
with the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations....
[Wie do not suggest, however, that the public is the client [of the gov-
ernment lawyer] as the client concept is usually understood. It is to
say that the lawyer's employment requires him to observe in the per-
formance of his professional responsibility the public interest sought
to be served by the governmental organization of which he is a part.
In re Lindsey,148 F.3d at 1109.
111. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1110.
112. Id. at 1111.
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Because both the Deputy White House Counsel and the Inde-
pendent Counsel occupy positions within the federal government,
their situation is somewhat comparable to that of corporate officers
who seek to keep their communications with company attorneys con-
fidential from each other and from the shareholders. Under the
widely followed doctrine announced in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, corpo-
rate officers are not always entitled to assert such privileges against
interests within the corporation, and accordingly must consult with
company attorneys aware that their communications may not be kept
confidential from shareholders in litigation. Any chill on candid
communications with government counsel flowing from our decision
not to extend an absolute attorney-client privilege to the grand jury
context is both comparable and similarly acceptable."
3
This is a long way from the Eighth Circuit's rejection of the
analogy to the attorney-client privilege as it exists in the corpo-
rate context. But what the D.C. Circuit treats as an after-
thought is actually the central point: an Independent Counsel
investigation of possible criminal misconduct by executive
branch officials is almost perfectly analogous to a derivative
suit brought by stockholders asserting management miscon-
duct or breach of a duty to the corporation. And the question of
whether an Independent Counsel is entitled to demand the
grand jury testimony of government lawyers concerning their
conversations with government officials about matters that
subsequently have come under the Independent Counsel's in-
vestigatory jurisdiction is almost exactly the same as the ques-
tion of whether stockholders bringing a derivative suit should,
upon a sufficient showing of colorable merit, be entitled to ac-
cess to otherwise-privileged communications to corporate coun-
sel by defendant members of present management-the issue
addressed by the Garner doctrine. The D.C. Circuit's opinion is
a step in the direction of a better approach to problems of this
sort-what I call a "Government Garner" doctrine.
113. Id. at 1112 (internal citation omitted).
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V. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS AND
"GOVERNMENT GARNER"
Under Upjohn, the attorney-client privilege of a corpora-
tion extends not only to communications between corporate of-
ficers and corporate counsel for purposes of obtaining legal ad-
vice for the corporation, but also to communications from lower
echelon employees to counsel for the corporation made for such
purpose, concerning matters within the scope of the employee's
duties for the entity.1 14 Clearly, communications from Presi-
dent Clinton, as CEO of USA, Inc., to legal counsel for the
United States (be it White House Counsel, the Attorney Gen-
eral, or another government lawyer), are covered by the Up-
john formulation. Although Hillary Clinton is technically nei-
ther an "officer" nor an "employee" of the executive branch (at
least not for all purposes,) 15 as a factual matter she probably
has the type of quasi-agency relationship to the United States
government that nonetheless brings her statements to
"corporate" counsel for the government within the ambit of
Upjohn. If the Upjohn privilege applies in the government
context, Mrs. Clinton's statements concerning incidents in-
volving herself and federal personnel occurring in the federal
workplace are likely covered by the government's attorney-
client privilege.11
6
Upjohn might initially appear to be a strong case for the
White House, for it is well accepted that present management
of the corporation "owns" the privilege and thus possesses the
114. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-97 (1980).
115. Cf. Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997
F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding Mrs. Clinton's health care task force covered
by the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)).
116. The status of Mrs. Clinton under Upjohn is not free from doubt, how-
ever. For the entity to be able to claim attorney-client privilege with respect
to the communications of persons to its attorneys, Upjohn requires that the
person have been communicating to counsel at the direction of her superiors,
concerning matters "within the scope of [her] duties." 449 U.S. at 394. To the
extent that Mrs. Clinton is a representative or agent of the United States gov-
ernment, she is President Clinton's constitutional subordinate. Her commu-
nications to White House Counsel were, at least impliedly, at President Clin-
ton's direction. Mrs. Clinton's activities in connection with the handling of
Rose Law Firm billing records certainly lie at the outer edge of plausible un-
derstanding of her "official" duties, but because they occurred on government
property and involved government personnel acting "on duty" (including Mrs.
Clinton, to whatever extent such a description applies to her), her actions
would seem to fit within Upjohn's description of the circumstances under
which the privilege attaches.
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prerogative to invoke or waive the privilege. 17 In the govern-
mental context, President Clinton and subordinate executive
branch officials subject to his direction and control constitute
the present management of USA, Inc. And unlike executive
privilege, which is subject to Nixon's balancing test, attorney-
client privilege, where it applies, is absolute." 8 No showing of
"compelling need" or other test of important justification
trumps the privilege. Thus (the argument might go), if Upjohn
applies to the federal government, the White House need not
produce the notes (in the Hillary Clinton case) or the witness
(in the Lindsey subpoena matter). Only if the requisites of the
absolute privilege are not satisfied, or if the privilege has been
waived, or if the communications are prima facie shown to
have been made for the purpose of and in furtherance of the
client's crime or fraud," 9 would the privilege not apply to de-
feat the subpoenas.
Each of these premises appears to be correct. But the con-
clusion is still wrong, because the argument fails to take into
account an additional well-recognized "exception" to the privi-
lege in the organizational client context: the so-called Garner
doctrine, named for the leading Fifth Circuit decision in Gar-
ner v. Wolfinbarger.120 As noted above, Garner addressed the
problem that exists when a shareholder's derivative suit,
brought (in theory) on behalf of the interests of the corporation,
alleges a violation by present management of duties owed to
the corporation as an entity.21 What happens in such a situa-
tion when present management asserts the attorney-client
privilege of the entity against another constituent of the entity,
117. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348-49 (1984).
11& See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 2081, 2087 (1998)
("[W]e have rejected use of a balancing test in defining the contours of the
privilege.") (citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562-64 (1989); In re
Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 49-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Hodge &
Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1977).
120. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970). The Garner doctrine has been applied
in a great many subsequent cases, by a large number of courts. See generally
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 774-76
(2d ed. 1994); 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§1.13:107, at 397 (Supp. 1998); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS § 6.5.5, at 288 (1986).
121. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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as a defense to discovery or testimony concerning certain com-
munications or documents?
The Fifth Circuit, observing that "when all is said and
done management is not managing for itself,"2 2 held that the
principles that govern assertion of the corporation's privilege
as against corporate outsiders do not necessarily govern with
respect to shareholders to whom management owes a fiduciary
duty.2 3 The court held that, while the corporation retained the
privilege, the availability of the privilege to present manage-
ment is "subject to the right of the stockholders to show cause
why it should not be invoked in the particular instance."124 The
court then listed a number of factors relevant to the determina-
tion of whether "good cause" exists to bar management from
asserting the privilege against shareholders also asserting the
rights of the corporation:
[Tihe bona fides of the shareholders; the nature of the shareholders'
claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent necessity or
desirability of the shareholders having the information and the avail-
ability of it from other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is
of wrongful action by the corporation, it is of action criminal, or ille-
gal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the communica-
tion related to past or to prospective actions; whether the communi-
cation is of advice concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which
the communication is identified versus the extent to which the
shareholders are blindly fishing;, the risk of revelation of trade secrets
or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an
interest for independent reasons.'2
The Fifth Circuit noted that traditional means of balancing
such interests, including protective orders imposing confiden-
tiality requirements on the shareholders, or in camera inspec-
tions, are available to trial judges considering such claims.126
The premise of the Garner doctrine is in many ways the
same as that which undergirds Upjohn and the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Weintraub:127 in the corporate context, the at-
torney-client privilege of the corporation belongs to the ficti-
tious legal person, the corporation, not the corporate officials
themselves. Weintraub held that a corporation's former man-
122. Garner, 430 F.2d at 1101.
123. See id. at 1101-02.
124. Id. at 1103-04.
125. Id. at 1104.
126. See id.
127. 471 U.S. 343 (1985).
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agement therefore may not assert the privilege against succes-
sor management; after all, the privilege belongs to the entity,
and a different group of managers is now in charge of the en-
tity.128 Garner's rule, which pre-dated Upjohn and Weintraub,
simply takes this premise to the next step: if the privilege be-
longs to the entity, it follows that the privilege may not right-
fully be asserted by any present officer or individual acting on
behalf of the entity, against the interests of the entity itself.
Thus, a shareholder legitimately acting on behalf of the corpo-
ration may contest management's assertion of the privilege. Of
course, the shareholders might not truly be representing the
best interests of the corporation (thus the requirement of "good
cause" and a list of factors relevant to this determination).
With some oversimplification, the Garner factors are criteria
for establishing that shareholders have made a plausible
showing, predicated on allegations of management's violation
of duties owed to the entity, that management's assertion of
the privilege against the shareholders is not really in the best
interests of the entity, but only in the self-interest of manage-
ment.
The Garner doctrine is entirely distinct from the crime-
fraud exception to the privilege (though they cover some of the
same ground and thus might both be applicable in a given
case).129 The crime-fraud exception, where it applies, negates
the existence of the privilege 3 0 The Garner doctrine negates
the exclusivity of present management's control of the privi-
lege, as against other constituents of the entity who possess a
legitimate claim to represent the interests of the entity.131 As
one leading scholarly treatment explains it, the crime-fraud ex-
ception "may be too narrow for the purposes envisioned by
Garner, which seeks to ensure the attorney-client privilege is
asserted in the best interests of the organization rather than
for the benefit of management. Garner is concerned with bad
faith in asserting the privilege, not bad faith in communicating
with counsel for an illegal purpose."32
128. See id.
129. See Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988)
(shareholders asserted both arguments unsuccessfully, in the alternative).
130. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989) (stating that
there is no attorney-client privilege if the communication was made to enable
anyone to commit a crime or fraud).
131. See Garner, 430 F.2d at 1103-04.
132. HAZARD ETAL., supra note 120, at 775.
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The distinction can be critical: the entity's attorney-client
privilege is not forfeited under the crime-fraud exception just
because the officer communicating with counsel for the entity
sought or made use of the legal advice for an illegal purpose.
133
Here is where the Eighth Circuit's awkward insight that "the
White House" cannot commit a crime arguably comes in. An
entity's attorney-client privilege is almost never lost because
the officers who actually engaged in discussions with counsel
did so for fraudulent or criminal purposes. The entity still pos-
sesses the privilege. It is up to present (or successor) manage-
ment whether to waive the privilege (and hang the officer, so to
speak) or to invoke it (to protect the officer). The decision to do
the latter does not itself mean a crime or fraud is being com-
mitted by the entity, but it may well constitute a situation in
which those invoking the privilege are not acting in the best in-
terests of the entity.
The parallels between the policies justifying the Garner
doctrine and the policies thought to justify the Independent
Counsel arrangement are fairly stunning. If anything, it would
seem that "Government Garner" in the context of an Independ-
ent Counsel investigation of members of present management
of the United States government is even more clearly war-
ranted than Garner itself, and should require less of a detailed
instance-by-instance examination of "cause" than Garner re-
quires in the derivative suit context. An Independent Counsel
investigation is premised on the Attorney General's certifica-
tion to a special judicial tribunal that there are grounds to be-
lieve that further investigation of the conduct of high executive
branch officials and their associates is warranted. (It is almost
as if present management, through an ombudsman's office, has
itself authorized the derivative suit for an "accounting" by pre-
sent management for its actions.) The Independent Counsel is
133. See In re Sealed Case, 107 F.3d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
It was not enough for the government to show that the vice president
committed a crime after he wrote his memorandum and attended the
late August meeting with Company counsel. The holder of the privi-
lege is the client and, in this case, the client was the Company, not
the vice president. Unless the government made some showing that
the Company intended to further and did commit a crime, the gov-
ernment could not invoke the crime-fraud exception to the privi-
lege.... True enough, within weeks of the meeting about campaign
finance law, the vice president violated that law. But the govern-
ment had to demonstrate that the Company sought the legal advice
with the intent to further its illegal conduct.
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appointed by, his jurisdiction prescribed by, and his conduct
supervised by, a special three-judge court. It would seem that,
at least presumptively, the "good cause" requirement, which
serves as a check against pure fishing expeditions by self-
appointed (and possibly self-interested) shareholders, is al-
ready satisfied in large measure by the statutory procedures
for appointment and supervision of the Independent Counsel.
It follows, I submit, that within the context of an Inde-
pendent Counsel investigation of members of present man-
agement of the United States government, including the Presi-
dent, it should almost always be the case that the Independent
Counsel-not the President-properly controls the decision of
the United States whether to assert the attorney-client privi-
lege of the United States as a limitation on the information
available to a federal criminal investigation. Present man-
agement of the United States may not assert the governmental
attorney-client privilege of the United States against a sub-
poena or other request for information submitted by a duly-
appointed Independent Counsel acting within the scope of her
jurisdiction on behalf of the United States.
Two caveats, implicit in the foregoing analysis, need to be
added. First, nothing in the notion of "Government Garner"
suggests that governmental attorney-client privilege does not
exist or cannot be invoked against outsiders to the executive
branch-such as Congress (since the relevant entity is the ex-
ecutive branch) or private litigants. Nor does the doctrine
mean that control of the privilege is reassigned entirely into
the hands of an Independent Counsel (such that he could waive
the privilege and reveal such communications to Congress or
others in a manner not consistent with existing statutory
authorization);134 appropriate protective orders, consistent with
the statute setting up the Independent Counsel relationship,
could be imposed. The Government Garner doctrine simply
posits that the President and his subordinates may not invoke
the attorney-client privilege of the United States as a prohibi-
tion on an Independent Counsel's access to information com-
municated to lawyers representing the United States.
This is a narrower, more precise-and, I submit, more
sound-rule, limiting the use of the privilege, than the Eighth
Circuit's articulation of the rule in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in In re Lindsey, rec-
134. See supra note 52.
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ognizing (in part) the relevance of the corporate analogy and
citing Garner in support of its holding, comes closer to the posi-
tion advanced here. In the end, however, In re Lindsey rests on
a balancing of factors as to whether the privilege should exist
in a certain context, not on a bright-line legal rule as to how
control of the privilege should be determined in intra-executive
disputes between an Independent Counsel and the administra-
tion, in a post-Morrison constitutional world.
The second caveat is that nothing in Government Garner
affects executive privilege-the qualified constitutional privi-
lege, recognized in United States v. Nixon, covering executive
branch deliberations generally. The analysis offered here only
applies to governmental attorney-client privilege. Where some
other privilege independently protects the confidentiality of the
communications at issue, this analysis would not apply to such
an independent claim. One could imagine a great many cir-
cumstances in which communications of government officers
and employees to government counsel, for purposes of enabling
the attorney to provide legal advice to the government, also
satisfy Nixon's presumptive constitutional privilege for execu-
tive branch deliberations. In such a case, the fact that the
President could not invoke attorney-client privilege against the
Independent Counsel would not necessarily preclude the
President from prevailing in his argument for executive privi-
lege under the Nixon framework.
CONCLUSION
It might be objected that the limitation on the govern-
ment's attorney-client privilege proposed here (or in the vari-
ants recognized by the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit) ul-
timately will prove harmful to the legitimate operation of
government. The argument has lessened force, of course, in a
case where a court, upon reviewing the materials in camera,
has found that the constitutional, executive privilege recognized
in Nixon does not justify nondisclosure of the information, or
where the executive privilege claim is so weak on its face that
it is not even attempted (or is attempted but quickly aban-
doned). One might disagree with the holding of Nixon, or think
(as I do) that its balancing test was insufficiently weighted in
favor of confidentiality, but that is not a reason to adopt a com-
pensating unsound rule concerning attorney-client privilege. If
Nixon is wrong on executive privilege, it should be overruled or
modified, but not through the expedient of creating a stronger,
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backdoor executive privilege applicable only when one or more
of the officials deliberating happens to be a lawyer. The D.C.
Circuit is right: there is no "lawyer exception" to Nixon, nor
should there be. 13
5
A different kind of objection is that it is absurd, practically
and constitutionally, to sanction the equivalent of "derivative
suits" against the President of the United States. But that is
not an argument against the corporate privilege analogy devel-
oped here. It is an argument against the policy of the JIde-
pendent Counsel statute, and against Morrison v. Olson. As
with Nixon, one can disagree with Morrison (as I do). But the
corrective is not to overrule it through the device of distortion
of the attorney-client privilege; it is to recognize that Morrison
is wrong as a matter of interpretation of Article II of the Con-
stitution. And even that corrective will not change the fact
that, from time to time, political realities will compel a Presi-
dent to appoint independent counsel where conduct of execu-
tive branch officials and associates is at issue.136
As long as Nixon and Morrison remain good law, the law of
attorney-client privilege in the governmental context must ac-
commodate the constitutional reality that the executive power
of the United States-and thus control of the attorney-client
privilege of the United States-is partially divested from the
President of the United States. One needs new wineskins to
hold the new wine. The Clinton era cases mark the initial ju-
dicial foray into this area, and are likely over time to be only
the first of numerous cases to develop the law of attorney-client
privilege in a post-Morrison world. Both courts' opinions bear
the mark of cases that appear early on in legal thinking about
an important issue, and that reflect some of the urgency of the
moment. The Eighth Circuit was the first to consider the issue
and its effort is understandably flawed and incomplete. The
D.C. Circuit had the benefit of an earlier case and of argu-
ments by counsel that had been revised and refined in light of
that case, but had the drawbacks of enormous time pressure
and great public consequences. Its analysis represents a re-
finement of the Eighth Circuit's, but the process of refinement
135. In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3176 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1998) (No. 98-316).
136. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Political pressures produced special prosecutors-for Teapot Dome and for
Watergate, for example-long before this statute created the independent
counsel.").
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plainly is not completed. The results in the Hillary Clinton
White House notes litigation and the Lindsey subpoena litiga-
tion nonetheless are critical steps in the direction of a new un-
derstanding of governmental attorney-client privilege in an era
of "divided management" of the executive power of the United
States government.

